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Abstract: 
 
In this paper，we will present a new key exchange system based on linear  
algebra, which spend less operations but weaker in security than the Diffie- 
Hellman’s one. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The key exchange system is one of the main and most important public key cryptosystems, which 
was firstly proposed by W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman [1] based on discrete logarithm problem 
(DLP) over a finite group of large order. In which the two users of the system take 1 2k kg ⋅ as the 
communication key between them, where 1kg and 2kg are the public keys of them respectively. 
There are an intensive researches on this system and discrete logarithm problem, for the detail 
material, refer to see [2].  
In this paper, we will present a new key exchange system based on linear algebra, which will 
spend less operations but weaker in the security than the one of W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman.  
 
2. Constructions and analysis 
 
The mechanism of our new key exchange system is actually based on a simple observation in 
linear algebra. 
Let K be a finite field ( )GF q , and for a positive integer m , denoted by mV = K the 
m -dimension vector space, and ( , )M m K the set of all m m×  matrices over the finite fieldK .  
Let Vζ ∈ , suppose that the two users A and B each takes a matrix ,AT ( , )BT M k∈ K as their 
privacy keys, and ( )AT ζ , ( )BT ζ as their public keys respectively. If matrices AT and BT  are 
commutative,  
A B B AT T T T⋅ = ⋅ ,                            (2.1) 
then the vector ( ) ( )A B B AT T T Tζ ζ⋅ = ⋅  can be used as the communicative key between the user 
A and the user B.  
Maybe, the easiest way to construct the privacy key matrices is that take privacy key matrices as 
, ,ii i
i
T c A c= ∈∑ K                           (2.2) 
where A is a matrix with constant entries. However, it is clear that for the cryptographic 
applications it should prevent the privacy key T from to be recovered from the public key ( )T ζ , 
and so each privacy key T should have suffice many variable entries. For example, it is easy to 
know that the privacy keys constructed as the form (2.2) will be easy recovered when the 
matrix A is known about its Jordan’s decomposition.  
 
In the following, we firstly describe our construction for the privacy keys and then provide a 
cryptanalysis for the new system. 
 
Let 2 ,m k= denoted by I the unit matrix of order k , and { | }Iμ μΓ = ∈K , and Λ the set of 
k k×  matrices with the form 1
1
λ
λ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
% %
% , λ∈K , and Δ = Γ∪Λ . Clearly, the matrices in 
Δ are commutative. Moreover, let  
              { } { }0 |0 | , , , , ,x a bx c dx a b c d⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠= ∈Δ = ∈ΔA  B           (2.3) 
then it is easy to verify that for any ,A B∈ ∈A  B , it has that 
.A B B A⋅ = ⋅                             (2.4) 
Moreover, denoted by ( )Q A and ( )Q B the rings generated byA and B  respectively. Then for 
any matrices ( )a∈Q A  and ( )z∈Q B , it has 
            z a a z⋅ = ⋅ .                               (2.5) 
It should be noticed that in general the products of matrices inB are not commutative, so a 
mono-term in ( )Q B is the form 1 2
1 2
skk k
sB B B" , iB ∈B , ik 0≥ , 1 i s≤ ≤ . 
Furthermore, for ( )z∈Q B , denoted by [ ]zQ  the polynomial ring  
[ ] | ( )ii i
i
z a z a⎧ ⎫= ∈⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑Q   Q A .                      (2.6) 
Then for any 1 2, [ ],T T z∈Q   clearly, 
1 2 2 1T T T T⋅ = ⋅ .                              (2.7) 
That is, [ ]zQ  is a commutative ring. 
Thereby, the elements of [ ]zQ  will be taken as the privacy keys. 
Next, we give some cryptanalysis for the system presented. 
Suppose that ( )T ζ ξ= , and AT is another privacy key, ( )A AT ζ ξ= , then it has    
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )A A A AT T T T T Tξ ζ ζ ξ= = = .                 (2.8) 
Let ( )A AT ξ ρ= , it follows  
( )A AT ξ ρ= .                              (2.9) 
Therefore, if there are m linearly independent public keys ( )i iTξ ζ= , 1 i m≤ ≤ , then the 
privacy key T will be recovered. 
 
Note. In fact, in general, the number of different variable entries of a matrix in [ ]zQ  is equal to 
2m , so it is likely that the number of the equations as (2.9) required to recovery privacy key 
T will be less than m . Of course, we may take the number of sub-matrices inA more than two, 
that is, take , 2.m dk d= ≥ In this way, the number of different variable entries of a privacy key 
matrices in general is equal to dm .   
 
Moreover, denoted by Ω the set of all the public keys, suppose that ( ) ,rank sΩ = and a 
adversary has s pairs of privacy keys and public keys ( , ( )),i iT T ζ 1 i s≤ ≤ , and 1{ ( )}siT ζ are 
linearly independent, then the adversary will be able to recovery any communicative key of any 
privacy key T without know the privacy key T . 
Suppose that β is a public key, then it can be written as 
1
( )i i
i s
c Tβ ζ
≤ ≤
= ∑ .                         (2.10) 
So, the communicative key ( )T β for the privacy key T can be represented as  
1 1
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))i i i i
i s i s
T T c T c T Tβ ζ ζ
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
= =∑ ∑ .                 (2.11) 
However, the communicative keys ( ( )),1 ,iT T i sζ ≤ ≤ are known for the adversary, and so he 
will recovery the communicative key ( )T β . 
 
The analyses above have demonstrated that the new system will be insecure if ones are able to 
access the privacy keys, even including themselves privacy keys. In other words, the privacy keys 
should be black for the users of the system.  
 
2. Conclusion 
 
The main advantage of the key exchange system presented is that spends less operations and so 
the implementation will be faster than Diffie-Hellman’s one, for the process of key exchange here 
is only a linear transformation. But, we also have seen that the new system is weaker in security 
than Diffie-Hellman’s one, and the applications will be restricted in the situations where the 
privacy keys are un-visible for the users, including himself privacy key, e.g. the communications 
with hardware.  
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